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Abstract. In standard Habermasian terms, legitimacy is the recognized worthiness of a 
political order that justifies and solidifies that order’s domination. It may thus appear 
that the concept of legitimation can only be applied to the political sphere, for instance 
to analyze the emergence of a political system such as Western Democracy. However, 
the growing political influence of neoliberal economic thought and policies allows the 
application of the concept of legitimacy to the knowledge underlying neo-liberalization. 
This article investigates the delegitimation of normative positivism, the epistemological 
premise of dominant analyses of economic action. The decontextualizing logic of those 
analyses continues guiding neo-liberal policies despite the evidence that these policies do 
not produce the promised results. At the same time, the marriage between political 
capitalism and positivist economic analyses presents both the knowledge and the 
resulting policies as the only possible solutions to the multiple crises of capitalism. 
Hence, I advocate for an increased reliance on institutionalist epistemologies that 
emphasize historical and cultural contextuality. In doing that, I highlight promising 
examples of institutionalist thought that can help accelerate the delegitimation of 
normative positivism and thus create openings for studying the alternatives to 
capitalism. 
Key words: legitimation, delegitimation, normative positivism, institutional epistemology. 
INTRODUCTION 
The inability of economics to predict major crises became clear during the global 
financial crisis, 2007–2008, in spite of the field‟s commitment to modeling and 
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forecasting (Silver 2012, 11–28). Statistician and political forecaster Nate Silver claims 
that the whole “history of trying to make economic forecasts is one of complete failure” 
(Campione 2015). Silver‟s observations are echoed by professional journalists (Shermer 
2012, Thoma 2014) and some economists (Krugman 2013; Lawson 2009; Smith 2015; 
Wieland and Wolters 2010). However, instead of signaling the end of liberal and neo-
liberal economics, the aftermath of the financial crisis was marked by increased austerity 
and financialization (Blyth 2013b; Jabko 2013; Jessop 2013; Lapavitsas 2011; Peck 
2013). The short answer to the paradox of why an empirically failed science dominates 
policy-making is “ideology” (Blyth 2013a; Harvey 2005), but it is unclear how that 
domination can be ended. 
The contrast between the empirical failures of economics and the field‟s leading role 
in policy-making highlights the need to explore the legitimacy relationship between an 
academic field and a policy paradigm. In standard Habermasian terms, legitimacy is the 
recognized worthiness of a political order that justifies and solidifies that order‟s 
domination (Habermas 1979, 178–182). It may thus appear that the concept of legitimacy 
can only be applied to the political sphere, for instance to analyze the emergence of a 
political system such as Western Democracy (e.g. Celikates, Kreide, and Wesche 2015). 
However, this article uses the concept of legitimacy to critique the knowledge creation 
that underlies the merger between neo-liberal economic thought and actual economic 
policies.  
On the one hand, dominant economic analyses and paradigms enjoy the endorsement 
of the political class and present neo-liberal capitalism as the only possible economic 
system of late modernity. Neo-liberalism here is understood as an adaptable ideological 
project aimed at establishing market relations as the modus operandi for politics, culture, 
education and economics alike (Harvey 2005; Glendhill 2004; Mudge 2008; Connell and 
Dados 2014; Giroux 2014; Kokushkin and Pettys 2015). On the other hand, the social 
science of economics engages in normal Kuhnian puzzle solving (see Kuhn 1996) without 
incorporating any forms of dissent within the main paradigm. Therefore, the processes of 
political legitimation of neo-liberalism may be accompanied by parallel processes of 
scientific delegitimation expressed by the empirical inefficacy of dominant economic 
theories and analyses. Based on the parallel processes of legitimation and delegitimation, 
I argue that alternative knowledge can contribute to the delegitimation of mainstream 
economics and the overall shift in the paradigm of the approach of social science to the 
economic sphere thus eventually leading to alternative policy formations. 
The article advances its argument by first exploring how the concept of legitimacy and 
the processes associated with it can be extended outside of the political sphere. In doing 
that, I point to the openness of Habermasian thought to such an extension. Then, the 
article proceeds with a detailed critique of the epistemological premises of economics – 
normative positivism and General Linear Reality (GLR) – in the context of the divergence 
of economic analyses from the empirical reality and actual people‟s experiences. Further, 
institutionalist alternatives are explored as a set of approaches that can remedy the 
epistemological issues introduced by normative positivism and GLR. Finally, a pathway 
to delegitimizing contemporary economics is discussed by highlighting contemporary 
works of promise.    
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LEGITIMACY 
In order to construct a working context for the argument, this section reviews a 
normative and a descriptive approach to legitimacy and builds the case for applying the 
concept to the study of economic life. Strictly speaking, there are three basic elements in 
Habermas‟s definition of legitimacy: (1) political order, (2) worthiness, and (3) 
recognition. The first pre-requisite, political order, Habermas emphasizes, shows the 
specific sphere where the concept operates (domain of application). To put it in other 
words, one could explore legitimacy only if the object is a certain political system, e.g. 
democracy. The second element is worthiness as a quality of the political order, which, in 
Habermas‟s view points out the contestability of legitimacy as a validity claim. Finally, 
the third element, recognition, reflects the acceptance of a political order as legitimate by 
society as a whole or a relevant social group that stabilizes the domination of that order 
(Habermas 1979, 178–182). 
Habermas‟s approach is normative in that it seeks to establish what a legitimate 
political order should look like (Connolly 1984, 12; Outhwaite 2009, 62). It is precisely 
because of that normative aspect that Habermas‟s concept of legitimacy can be applied 
outside of the immediate jurisdiction of the political sphere by tracing factors residing in 
the economic and cultural spheres that affect the worthiness and recognition of the 
political order. In fact, Habermas himself highlights the close ties between the economic 
and political spheres in liberal capitalism (McCarthy 1984, 159–161; Outhwaite 2009, 
63–64). Recognizing that multiple types of domination overlap in political capitalism then 
allows the application of legitimacy to the intersections between the political, economic 
and cultural/knowledge spheres.  
Habermas‟s normative orientation is inseparable from Weber‟s descriptive/positive1 
approach to legitimacy, because Weber views legitimation as the process through which 
the relationship between rulers and the ruled is established. Weber‟s framework 
distinguishes among four different types of potentially legitimate domination: legal, 
charismatic, traditional, and a mixture of the last two, e.g. feudalism. Characteristic of 
modernity, legal domination is the submission to impersonal norms rather than to 
individuals. Legal domination is thus the opposite of charismatic domination, which is 
brought about by legitimizing the abnormal qualities of a leader‟s character. Further, 
traditional domination develops through the legitimation of sacred enduring practices, in 
accordance to which the leader is provided with respective fidelity. The last type of 
domination, feudalism, combines elements of charisma and tradition and is legitimated 
through a contract between the lord and the vassal (Swedberg 1998, 62–69).  
Weber considers only legal domination to be inherent in rational capitalism, while the 
other three types have a more or less negative impact on rational capitalism. For instance, 
political capitalism and economic traditionalism both rely on traditional domination, 
while charisma and tradition combine with no form of capitalism, because the two 
characterize feudalism (Swedberg 1998, 68–69). If one considers neo-liberal capitalism to 
be a form of political capitalism (Prechel 2012), then the normative and positive 
                                                          
1 I use the terms positive and descriptive interchangeably in opposition to the term normative. 
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approaches to legitimacy can be combined to explain how an empirically flawed paradigm 
can be dominant/legitimate in descriptive terms and illegitimate in normative terms. 
While Weber‟s discussion of political capitalism is not as comprehensive as his 
discussion of rational capitalism (Holcombe 2015), the concept is applicable to late 
modernity by virtue of the fusion of the political and economic elite. In the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, 2007–2008, political capitalism can be defined as “a system in 
which the political and economic elite design the rules so that they can use the political 
system to maintain their elite positions” (Holcombe 2015, 43). Given the expansive nature 
of political capitalism, one could also add the academic elite, particularly in economics, 
as a constitutive component of the dominant no-alternative neo-liberal order.  
Ontologically, mainstream economics does not even recognize the existence of the 
concept of political capitalism. In its quest to establish the superiority of capitalism over 
socialism before the collapse of state socialism and the diversity within the presumed 
rational capitalist systems, the dominant paradigm in economics has failed to question its 
very assumption of rational capitalism (Holcombe 2015, 43–46). Further, the 
epistemology of mainstream economics reinforces the inability to recognize the very 
concept of political capitalism. In particular, the rationality and atomicity assumptions 
underlying economic models make it impossible to account for collective interests that 
may create inefficiencies and irrationality in an economic system in order to maintain elite 
power. The fact that the income of the economic elite is responsible for the global 
financial crisis is at an all-time high (Crowe 2015) illustrates that point.  
NORMATIVE POSITIVISM AND GENERAL LINEAR REALITY 
So far, I have stressed that political capitalism relies on a production of knowledge 
about economics that legitimizes its domination. That knowledge is produced by 
mainstream economics, which claims to rely on objective scientific theories and evidence. 
In addition, I have asserted that legitimacy can be approached from both normative and 
positive perspectives. Because of its ties to modern political institutions, mainstream 
economics is a social scientific field that can be evaluated using a legitimacy framework.  
In Habermasian terms, such an evaluation can be justified because the extreme 
positivism of mainstream economics could be seen altering the very premises of social 
science, particularly its relationship with history and contextuality (Outhwaite 2009, 22). 
In this context, the abstract mathematical economic models and their assumptions can be 
seen as an example of scientific achievements with thorough ideological implications 
(Habermas 1970, 81–82). This section elaborates on the normative aspects of a positivist 
epistemology directly related to the inability of a social science to detect specific social 
formations. 
If political capitalism benefits from remaining unexamined, the tools used to present it 
as rational capitalism have direct normative implications. In this sense, a form of 
positivism can be normative in that it assumes a certain image of the world that should 
exist based on a given set of prescriptions. Hence, normative positivism can shift the 
epistemological basis of a social scientific field away from exploring an existing reality or 
exploring an existing reality through a specific ideological lens (Tinker, Merino, and 
Neimark 1982). For example, within normative positivism, economic activity can be 
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approached through abstract formal mathematical models that rely on a fixed set of 
variables, rather than as a complex social, cultural and historical process.   
The resulting inconsistency between theoretical and empirical investigations is 
conceptually, albeit artificially, resolved by a set of assumptions described as General 
Linear Reality (Stroschein 2012, 33–35). Defined as a way of thinking that treats linear 
models as representative of social reality (Abbott 1988, 170), General Linear Reality 
(GLR) constructs an image of social science as the equivalent of a natural science applied 
to the individuals in society. Here, social science is assigned the status of a young and 
undeveloped science that relies on the same epistemological and logical premises as 
natural science (Bernstein 1978). While GLR has had its successes, its assumptions can 
skew knowledge creation in the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities 
(Adriani and McKelvey 2011). 
GLR postulates that its linear models can be generalized, because it operates under the 
premise that individuals and collectives can be treated as variables – uniform objects of 
study whose attributes can change. However, committing to the uniformity assumption 
denies the potential for human agency, individual or collective, in relation to structures. 
Thus, GLR postulates that macro-structures cause micro-structures, but not vice versa. In 
addition, GLR assumes that the attributes of the variables it uses are the same across 
histories, geographies and academic contexts thus ignoring the fact that these concepts are 
grounded in specific contexts, which are subject to change
2
 (Abbott 2001, 37–63). 
Ultimately, GLR underlies a positivist social science that decontextualizes social issues 
thus generating abstract disconnected knowledge about a highly complex social world.   
The limitations of GLR are not new and neither are the calls for increased 
contextuality in the study of social processes. For instance, Bernstein argues that an 
“adequate, comprehensive political and social theory must be at once empirical, 
interpretative, and critical” (Bernstein 1978, xiv). However, the shift of focus towards 
contextuality signals an increase in the complexity of the analysis and applicability of that 
analysis to social life. In other words, GLR‟s continuing dominance in economics may 
have two possible explanations. First, GLR offers an uncomplicated and accessible 
approach to analyzing social life in general and economic activity in particular. 
Economists can thus be trained to be technically competent in a very efficient way. 
Second, thanks to outside influence from related fields, GLR can adjust its models to 
include cultural or other contextual variables without altering its assumptions. 
Without altering its assumptions, adaptation and change within GLR would thus have 
no effect on normative positivism. Instead, new frameworks need to be constructed. The 
alternatives may then include constructing a wider range of models – demographic, 
sequential or network – of reality (Abbott 2001), revising the concept of time in social 
science as contextually relative and contained in events (Bluedorn 2002), or 
reconceptualizing the relationship between subject and object beyond established 
functionalizing patters (Mannheim 1985). These and other alternatives to GLR can offer 
legitimate, in Habermasian terms, knowledge that reflects social reality, rather than one 
                                                          
2 For instance, Foucault argues that key economic concepts like money and markets did not exist in the 17 th and 
18th centuries. Yet, contemporary economic theories apply these concepts retroactively and thus reconstruct a 
history that did not exist (Foucault 1990, 177–225). This critique equally applies to the assumption that 
economic variables and their attributes have the exact same meaning across all cultural or historical contexts.  
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that relies on the domination of the normative positivism paradigm. As Mannheim points 
out, “A new type of objectivity in the social sciences is attainable not through the 
exclusion of evaluations but through the critical awareness and control of them” 
(Mannheim 1985, 5), which means that a positivist component can be retained, but one 
that yields a different kind of objectivity. 
While the historical, cultural, and linguistic turns in different areas of social science 
have produced contextualized knowledge, mainstream economics has been immune to 
such change. Hence, challenging the epistemological aspects of normative positivism is 
not sufficient, because the underlying GLR assumptions remain untouched. GLR is in part 
so powerful, because it is premised on the notion that normal science is universally 
objective and therefore universally applicable. However, this section claimed that GLR 
does not reflect actual social reality, which questions its scientific value and delegitimizes 
its continual use in policy-making. In the sections that follow, I explore that critique in 
more detail by discussing a set of inter- and trans-disciplinary approaches that tackle the 
very assumptions of GLR and normative positivism.  
INSTITUTIONALIST ALTERNATIVES TO NORMATIVE POSITIVISM 
Institutionalism, a school of thought that stresses that institutions and organizations are 
theoretically, empirically and practically crucial social phenomena (Sum and Jessop 2013, 
33), is a framework committed to developing alternative knowledge and challenging 
dominant paradigms that exist in any given social scientific field. In defiance of GLR‟s focus 
on individuals, the very premise of institutionalism is that social formations are more than 
the sum of the individuals involved. Institutionalism is broadly divided into two branches – 
early and new – historically located in the first and second halfs of the 20th century 
respectively. However, within each branch, institutionalisms vary by field and ideas. For 
example, early institutionalists in economics were calling for a reversal of the postulates of 
classical economics. In political science, however, early institutionalists established the basis 
for positivism in the field. Alternatively, the views of early institutionalists in sociology 
ranged from structuralism to interactionism (Scott 2001, 2–21) .  
The new institutionalists are following the path of offering multiple alternatives to 
dominant paradigms, rather than a single specific alternative (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Conceiving of neo-institutionalism as one epistemological approach in social science 
could be problematic (March and Olsen 1984), but the search for contextuality beyond the 
canons is endemic in institutionalist
3
 thought and in institutional analyses of economic 
policy in particular. Typically, the search for contextuality includes historicity and 
cultural analysis. To demonstrate the focus on contextuality in institutionalist analyses, 
this section offers a discussion of several exemplars that highlight institutionalist thought. 
                                                          
3 After introducing early and new institutionalism as categorically distinct forms of institutionalism, I proceed 
by referring to institutionalism and institutionalist approaches, rather than the technically accurate new 
institutionalism and new institutionalist approaches. I do that because there is a tendency to view DiMaggio 
and Powell‟s seminal piece “The Iron Cage Revisited” (1983) as representative of neo-institutionalism. 
However, the actual heterogeneity in institutionalist thinking is such that the distinction between early and new 
institutionalisms is more periodical than analytical. 
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Each exemplar below offers a distinct alternative to normative positivism and GLR and 
thus outlines strategies for delegitimizing GLR as a valid premise for knowledge 
production in the spheres of economic activity and policy.  
Within economics, institutionalist analyses challenge neo-classical and neo-liberal 
economics by stressing the importance that culture has on actual economic processes. 
That importance is contrasted with the fact that the assumptions that guide economic 
modeling ignore culture as a factor. For example, Douglas North‟s “Institutions, 
Institutional Change, And Economic Performance” (1990) targets key assumptions as 
particularly inadequate by pointing out that economic actor‟s decisions are impacted by 
the unequal amounts and quality of information that they can access. In addition, 
economic actors do not have equal guarantees of their property rights, because 
contemporary capitalism and its markets reward economic actors who are better informed. 
Moreover, the actual process of defining and enforcing property rights goes through legal 
and political institutions that design and apply certain rules to some and not others (North 
1990).  
Douglas North‟s economic institutionalism is still present in the field of economics, 
particularly in the works of prominent economists like Joseph Stiglitz (e.g. 2003, 2015) 
and Paul Krugman (e.g. 2007, 2009) and the subfield of heterodox economics (Lawson 
2006, 2009). While economic institutionalism may not address the issues of power 
directly, they are at least implicit in the relationships between different types of economic 
actors. Further, these institutionalists insist that structures, identities and history play a 
crucial role in economic behavior thus negating GLR‟s focus on generalizable individual 
characteristics.  
Similarly, within political science, institutionalist analyses draw attention “to the role 
that strategic interaction between actors plays in the determination of political outcomes” 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, 950), which is in stark contrast with GLR‟s assumption of 
unidirectional causality. However, new institutionalism in political science also focuses 
on issues of power. GLR‟s assumptions are thus challenged even further. For example, in  
“Markets and States in Tropical Africa” Bates (1981) directly critiques abstract linear 
models and thus GLR. Bates frames economic developments in 20th century African 
societies in terms of political interests and power, rather than efficiency and bounded 
rationality. He argues that an abstract model is not worth credibility, if it refuses to 
accommodate for the specificities of real cases (Bates 1981).  
Further, the futility of abstract models is illustrated by the exploitative relationship 
between the elite and small-scale farmers in the African societies in question. Bates 
claims that African farmers are subjected to below-market purchase prices despite the 
predictions of economic models of market equilibrium (Bates 1981). Not unlike North, 
Bates‟s departure from GLR allows him to emphasize how crucial contextuality is when 
analyzing economic processes and to detect power relations in the background. However, 
neither discusses the concept of power or the power relationship that installs an 
empirically inaccurate paradigm as the guiding framework in understanding economics or 
designing economic policies. 
In addition to connecting culture and history, sociological institutionalism detects and 
directly addresses issues of power between groups and societal formations. Sociological 
institutionalism takes those connections even further by tackling structural power (Hall 
and Taylor 1996). For instance, Frank Dobbin‟s “Forging Industrial Policy” (1994) 
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illustrates how institutionalists can draw connections between history, culture and power. 
Dobbin argues that political culture influences both the perceptions of existing economic 
problems and choices of potential policy solutions. Accordingly, the causal processes that 
lead to particular policy choices are different across geographical and political contexts. 
Further, unique political traditions shape collective understandings of social order and 
instrumental rationality. This political culture approach leads to the conclusion that the 
industrial policies pursued in the railroad sector in France, Britain, and the United States, 
were reflective of the political-economic models followed by these countries and the pre-
existing institutional arrangements that affected the 19th century economic institutions in 
the three countries (Dobbin 1994). 
The exemplars of institutionalist alternatives to normative positivism and GLR 
discussed in this section all illustrate that the integration of culture in the study of 
economic institutions or policies is an important step in moving away from GLR, because 
culture allows the creation of a better fit between theory and research. However, to offer a 
meaningful alternative, an institutionalist approach should also be historical. Taking time 
and history into account drives the analysis away from the realist fallacies that lead to 
abstract models of capitalist development disconnected from actual realities. At the same 
time, there is room in institutionalism for strengthening its focus on power in order to 
actively contribute to the delegitimation of normative positivism in economics and 
economic policy-making. The following section lays out the mechanism that can serve as 
the premise for such refocusing of institutionalism. 
THE PROCESS OF DELEGITIMATION 
Delegitimation, the opposite of legitimation, can be defined as the process through 
which a power and prestige order loses the properties that have collective support. The 
process can be initiated and supported by specific events that undermine the normative 
prescriptions of a dominant order and change the expectations toward that order (Berger 
et al. 1998). According to Habermas, legitimation crises are an inherent trait of the 
capitalist society because of the social issues and contradiction that the system fails to 
resolve on a regular basis. In that context, GLR then serves a role in masking the 
legitimation crises of a system by providing a seemingly legitimate basis for assessing the 
systems crises and their origins. This article continues by making the point that since 
crises can be seen as sites for potential transformations (Kellner 1989, 197–198) 
delegitimizing GLR can open up a conversation about such changes removing the false 
perception that political capitalism is rational capitalism.  
As highlighted in the beginning of this article, political capitalism can exist as a 
descriptively legitimate order (in Weber‟s terms) and as a normatively illegitimate order 
(in Habermas‟s terms) that relies on political, economic and cultural/knowledge structures 
for its dominance. Yet, recent political and economic crises, that is, major events that 
undermine the normative prescriptions of the order, have not resulted in its 
delegitimation. The latter can be explained with the resilience of legitimate structures, 
even when there are inconsistencies between their normative prescriptions and task 
outcomes (Berger et al. 1998). 
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A Habermasian explanation of the continued positive legitimacy of political capitalism 
and neo-liberalism would then focus on the fact that the current legitimation crises are not 
accompanied by motivation crises. In other words, the delegitimation of political 
capitalism cannot produce openings that would lead to post-capitalism, unless the cultural 
sphere, including knowledge structures, stops supporting the dominant order and creates a 
motivation crisis (Kellner 1989, 198–202). I argue elsewhere that the Occupy Movement 
presents a blueprint for using communicative action to plant the long-term seeds for a 
motivation crisis (Kokushkin 2015). However, this article stresses the ongoing immediate 
role that institutionalism can play in such a motivation crisis by fostering the 
delegitimation of the knowledge structures that support political capitalism. 
Because of the heterogeneity of institutionalist analyses in terms of social scientific 
fields, objects of study and level of analysis, institutionalist epistemologies can challenge 
both the premises of normative positivism and the support it lends to political capitalism 
via mainstream economics. Hence, one could expand Sum and Jessop‟s (2013, 38) 
typology of institutionalisms to include transformative institutionalism whose motto could 
read, “Studying institutions can challenge the way in which a dominant order is 
legitimized.”  
In order to delegitimize mainstream economics and its domination of economic 
policy-making, institutionalism can tackle two aspects of political capitalism‟s empirical 
legitimacy. First, institutionalism can challenge the consensus that abstract economic 
models are the norm when it comes to analyzing economic processes. As Berger et al. 
point out, high levels of consistency, compactness and comprehensiveness of a status 
structure tend to lead to legitimate orders (Berger et al. 1998). It is not surprising then that 
a simple yet pervasive framework, such as GLR, can help solidify the domination of neo-
liberal economics and underlie austerity policies consensually perceived as having no 
alternatives. Second, Berger et al. stress that a process of delegitimation necessarily 
involves the modification of the performance expectations toward a legitimate order in a 
way that those expectations cannot be met by that order (Berger et al. 1998). Within the 
framework I have developed here, such modification would actually mean that economics 
is expected to act like a social science where theory and research interact in a way that 
connects the production of knowledge with an empirical reality. 
INSITUTIONALSM‟S ROLE IN DELEGITIMATION 
I now turn to institutionalist analyses that illustrate how delegitimation can develop. 
The examples discussed below are by no means exhaustive, but highlight key 
contradictions in the study of economic activity that contribute to the delegitimation of the 
related production of knowledge. I break down institutionalist contributions into three 
broad and frequently intersecting analytical categories of delegitimation efforts: 1) direct 
challenges to mainstream, (i.e. classical, neo-classical and neo-liberal) economics and 
GLR; 2) alternative empirical explorations to those in mainstream economics; and 3) 
alternative conceptual and long-term visions for analyzing economic activity. 
Within the first category, institutionalist approaches point to the empirical failures of 
mainstream economics and connect those failures with assumed empirically-driven 
economic policies. For example, Streeck claims that capitalism cannot be empirically 
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explained using GLR and the tools of mainstream economics. Further, the empirical 
reality of increased financialization at the expense of growing inequality through austerity 
does not reflect the efficiency logic of economic models, which claim to represent rational 
capitalism. Ultimately, Streeck calls for a new theory of capitalism reflective of Polanyian 
and Habermasian concerns over the cultural nature of markets and the political 
contradictions embedded in capitalist processes (Streeck 2010). 
Similarly, Sum and Jessop critique the narrow disciplinary approaches to the study of 
economic activity embraced by mainstream economics. The authors go even further in 
pointing out the role economics education plays in the quasi-religious entrenchment of the 
“naïve, positivist belief that the market economy exists and can be studied in isolation 
from other spheres of social relations” (Sum and Jessop 2013, 12). Hence, 
institutionalism can contribute to the delegitimation of mainstream economics and 
normative positivism by shedding light on the institutional logics that structure the 
creation of deeply unscientific and ideological knowledge that is used to guide policies. In 
that sense, institutionalism is invested in unveiling the connections that political 
capitalism is deeply invested in ignoring. 
Within the second analytical category, institutionalism uncovers the inability of 
mainstream economics to detect failures and contradictions of the institutions and 
organizations of modern capitalism. Jens Beckert‟s work on fictionality and economic 
processes demonstrates the endogeneity of economic projections in the models that 
generate those projections. The guiding role of fictional expectations in motivating 
economic action is both contrasted and integrated with rational calculations. While 
Beckert does not directly challenge the premises of political capitalism, he uses the 
institutional and cultural embeddedness of economic expectations to explain how fictional 
and imaginary expectations become a legitimate mechanism for economic action. In 
contrast, two GLR pillars – rational calculations and macrostructures – are dismissed as 
causal factors of economic decision-making (Beckert 2013). 
Although in a different substantive area, Harland Prechel‟s work on organizational 
deviance also offers an empirical analysis that would not be supported by mainstream 
economics. Prechel‟s capital-dependence theory offers a mezzo-level analysis reflective 
of actual empirical arrangements. The theory focuses on: 1) identifying how specific 
historical conditions produce economic policies that affect irrational economic agents and 
2) the role economic agents play in shaping those economic policies (Prechel 2000, 266). 
This institutionalist theory is then able to establish that the economic elite exercise 
continuous political pressure on government bodies, which produces a power imbalance 
between corporations and the state (Prechel and Morris 2010). 
Here, institutionalism‟s contribution to the delegitimation of mainstream economics 
and GLR operates on several levels. On the one hand, institutionalist research showcases 
a wide and diverse range of tools that can be used to analyze economic activity more 
contextually, instead of a limited decontextualized set of models. On the other hand, the 
findings and conclusions of institutionalist research highlight the fact that contemporary 
capitalism is in fact not rational capitalism.  
Within the third analytical category, institutionalism can help delegitimize normative 
positivism and mainstream economics by offering alternative visions for approaching and 
analyzing economic activity. Institutionalisms belonging to this category recognize that 
the epistemological stance of mainstream economics has deep ontological implications 
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and changing the method can have profound effects on the results and implications of 
economic analyses. The focus on heterogeneity and the overall lack of coherence among 
all the strains of institutionalism can thus be reconceptualized as their major strength. For 
instance, Tony Lawson argues that the heterodox economics movement presents a diverse 
and multifaceted vision of economic analysis that goes beyond the methodological 
fundamentalism of mainstream economics. Hence, this vision aligns economics with the 
complexities of the social world the science studies (Lawson 2006). 
Beyond economics, trans- and post-disciplinary institutionalist perspectives can take 
advantage of the reflexivity and recursivity embedded in them to offer a dynamic vision 
of for analyzing economic activity. In this context, the Cultural Political Economy (CPE) 
advanced by Sum and Jessop denies the normative premises for the legitimacy of 
mainstream economics and points to the relationship between complexity and complexity 
reduction, which are conceptualized as parts of the same process of studying the social 
world (Sum and Jessop 2013, 467–483).  
Further, this type of institutionalism is committed to developing and updating an 
ongoing critique of capitalist social formations, rather than a set of universal principles. In 
maintaining a level of fluidity, CPE can thus borrow and negotiate constructivist and 
structuralist ideas as needed (Sum and Jessop 2013, 467–483). An institutionalist vision 
for the alternative analysis of economic life is therefore not a vision of a coherent 
paradigm replacing a failing coherent paradigm. Instead, institutionalism celebrates 
diversity and heterogeneity in a way that recognizes that economic activity is deeply 
social, cultural and historical.  
CONCLUSION 
This article set out to establish a positively legitimate (in Weberian terms) 
manifestation of political capitalism – mainstream economics – experiencing 
delegitimation (in normative Habermasian terms) while dominating a cultural order. 
However, registering the inability of dominant economic analyses to produce knowledge 
that reflects an empirical reality cannot be an end on its own. The delegitimation of 
mainstream economics is a necessary step in the construction of diverse alternative 
frameworks capable of analyzing contemporary capitalism.  
 While classical Marxism has been accused of engaging in reductionist economic 
analysis (Sayer 1998, 137), it aimed at advancing a comprehensive critique of capitalism 
and an alternative to liberal/classical economic analyses. In other words, the 
legitimation/delegitimation dynamics discussed in this article are not new. However, what 
is new is the differentiated way in which contemporary capitalism operates. Its core 
process, variegated neo-liberalization, enables capitalism to engage in “systemic 
production of geoinstitutional differentiation” (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010, 184). 
Because contemporary capitalism operates in non-linear patterns that inform one another, 
even when they occur across different territories and times (Kokushkin and Pettys 2015), 
classical Marxism would not be an appropriate tool to use. 
The close connection between a great deal of institutionalist analyses and critical 
theory (see Dugger and Sherman 1994) provides continuity between Marxian and 
contemporary critiques of capitalism. The unique role that insitutionalism can play is thus 
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to delegitimize the knowledge that supports political capitalism. In a context where 
economic reductionism in the form of normative positivism and GLR dominates 
economic analyses and policies, alternatives are not even considered, because there are no 
legitimate alternatives. It is thus the task of institutionalism to generate such alternatives.  
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PROPITUJUĆI LEGITIMNOST NORMATIVNOG POZITIVIZMA: 
INSTITUCIONALNE ALTERNATIVE DOMINANTNIM 
ANALIZAMA EKONOMSKE AKCIJE 
U standardnim Habermasovskim terminima legitimacija je prepoznata zasluga političkog 
poretka koja opravdva i učvršćuje dominaciju tog poretka. Može se stoga činiti da koncept 
legitimacije može biti primenjen samo na političku sferu, na primer da bi se analizirala pojava 
političkog sistema kakav je Zapadna demokratija. Ipak, rastući politički uticaj neoliberalne 
ekonomske misli i primenjenih politika dozvoljava primenu koncepta legitimacije na znanje na 
kome se neoliberalizam temelji. Ovaj tekst istražuje delegitimaciju normativnog pozitivizma, kao 
epistemološke premise dominantnih analiza ekonomske akcije. Dekontekstuališuća logika tih 
analiza nastavlja da vodi neoliberalne primenjene politike uprkos evidenciji da te politike ne vode 
obećanim rezultatima. U isto vreme, brak izmeĎu političkog kapitalizma i pozitivističke ekonomske 
analize  predstavlja i znanje i rezultirajuće primenjene političke planove kao jedina moguće 
rešenja višestrukoj krizi kapitalizma. Stoga, u radu se zalažem za pojačano oslanjanje na 
institucionalističke epistemologije koje naglašavaju istorijsku i kulturnu kontekstualnost. Čineći to, 
ističem i obećavajuće primere institucionalističke misli koji mogu ubrzati delegitimaciju 
normativnog pozitivizma te tako otvoriti mogućnosti za pručavanje alternativa kapitalizmu. 
Ključne reči:  legitimacija, delegitimacija, normativni pozitivizam, institucionalna epistemologija. 
    
